

## Message Text

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ACTION IO-10

INFO OCT-01 AF-06 ARA-06 EUR-12 EA-06 NEA-10 ISO-00 AGR-05

CEA-01 CIAE-00 COME-00 DODE-00 EB-07 FRB-03 H-02

INR-07 INT-05 L-03 LAB-04 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 AID-05

CIEP-01 SS-15 STR-04 TAR-01 TRSE-00 USIA-06 PRS-01

SP-02 FEAE-00 OMB-01 OES-03 ERDA-05 OIC-02 IOE-00

/140 W

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R 230500Z MAY 75 ZDK  
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 225  
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN  
AMEMBASSY ACCRA  
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS  
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE  
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
AMEMBASSY CARACAS  
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO  
AMEMBASSY DAKAR  
AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN  
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA  
AMEMBASSY KINGSTON  
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA  
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR  
AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
AMEMBASSY LIMA  
AMEMBASSY MANILA  
AMEMBASSY MEXICO  
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI  
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
AMEMBASSY RABAT  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
AMCONSUL RI DE JANEIRO  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 4644

.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: EGEN, UNGA, PK

SUBJ: UNGA SPECIAL SESSION: PAKISTAN ATTITUDES

REFERENCES: A. STATE 75525; B. STATE 112992

SUMMARY: PAKISTAN'S GENERAL APPROACH TO THE SEVENTH UNGA SPECIAL SESSION (7SS) WILL FOLLOW THE USUAL PATTERN: SOME ATTEMPT TO EXERCISE A MODERATING INFLUENCE WITHIN THE GROUP OF 77, BUT NO WILLINGNESS TO VOTE AGAINST A POSITION BACKED BY LDC CONSENSUS. THE GOP IS EAGER TO SEE 7SS ACHIEVE CONCRETE RESULTS AND AWARE THAT THESE DEPEND ON DC COOPERATION. PRIORITY AREAS FOR THE GOP ARE RESOURCE TRANSFER, TRADE PREFERENCES, COMMODITY PRICES, AND TECHNOLOGY. WE MAY BE ABLE TO ENCOURAGE PAKISTANI PRAGMATISM BY FURTHER DISCUSSIONS OF SPECIFIC PROPOSALS IN THESE AND OTHER CONCRETE AREAS OF INTEREST TO THEM. PAKISTAN'S DESIRE TO BURNISH ITS THIRD WORLD AND MUSLIM LEADERSHIP CREDENTIALS, HOWEVER, WILL PUT NARROW LIMITS ON THE AMOUNT OF FLEXIBILITY IN THE PAKISTANI POSITION. END SUMMARY.

1. ECON/COMM COUNSELOR AND ECONOFF HAD EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION OF UNGA SPECIAL SESSION (7SS) MAY 21 WITH MFA ACTING DIRGEN (UN AFFAIRS) MUNIR AKRAM. FROM HIS REMARKS, IT IS CLEAR THAT PAKISTAN WILL ADHERE TO ITS TRADITIONAL ATTITUDE IN UN DISCUSSIONS--PAKISTAN WILL TRY, AT LEAST UP TO A POINT TO EXERT A MODERATING INFLUENCE WITHIN THE LDC BLOC, BUT WILL NOT BREAK RANKS WHEN IT COMES TIME TO VOTE.

2. AKRAM SAID THAT PAKISTAN'S PREPARATIONS FOR 7 SS WERE ALREADY UNDER WAY. PAKISTAN HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED WITH THE RESULTS OF 6 SS. NOT ENOUGH CONCRETE ACHIEVEMENTS HAD BEEN REGISTERED, AND COUNTRIES WHOSE SUPPORT WAS ESSENTIAL TO ACHIEVING BASIC LDC ECONOMIC GOALS--PRIMARILY THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES--HAD NOT BEEN FULLY IN SUPPORT OF THE DECLARATIONS THAT THE EARLIER SESSION HAD ENDORSED.  
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AS A RESULT, THE SESSION MIGHT EVEN HAVE BEEN DAMAGING TO LDC GOALS, HE FELT. PAKISTAN WAS ANXIOUS, HE SAID, TO DO BETTER THIS TIME, IN TERMS OF BOTH CONCRETE RESULTS AND DC SUPPORT. TO THIS END, PAKISTAN WAS EAGER TO AVOID A CONFRONTATION SESSION.

3. IDEALLY, AKRAM THOUGHT, 7SS SHOULD START FROM SOME GENERAL, AGREED BASIS--HE MENTIONED THE INTERNATIONAL

DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY AS A POSSIBILITY--AND PROCEED FROM THERE. HE AGREED WITH EMBOFFS' POINT THAT GENERAL DECLARATIONS TENDED TO LEAD TO RATHER STERILE IDEOLOGICAL DEBATE WHICH 7SS WOULD DO WELL TO AVOID, BUT PLEADED WITH US TO BE WILLING TO PUT UP WITH A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF WHAT HE CALLED STANDARD (AND OFTEN HYPOCRITICAL) UN RHETORIC.

HE WAS CONCERNED THAT THE US MIGHT SPARK AN IDEOLOGICAL CONFRONTATION OF IT "WENT INTO OPPOSITION" ALONG THE LINES OUTLINED IN AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN'S RECENT ARTICLE IN COMMENTARY( WHICH HE HAD READ AND DISAGREED FUNDAMENTALLY WITH).

4. CONCRETE AREAS WHICH THE PAKISTANIS WOULD LIKE TO SEE ADDRESSED IN 7SS, AKRAM SAID, INCLUDE PRIMARILY THE FOLLOWING:

(A) RESOURCE TRANSFER: WORLDWIDE, THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN FALLING BEHIND IN THEIR EFFORTS TO MEET THE ONE PERCENT OF GNP TRANSFER TARGET, DESPITE THE SLIGHT RISE IN THE US AID/GNP PERCENTAGE. THE TIME HAD COME, PAKISTAN FELT, TO TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT THAT TARGET AND AT CONCRETE WAYS EITHER TO ACHIEVE IT OR TO SET UP A MORE MEANINGFUL ONE.

(B) TRADE AND COMMODITIES: MORE PROGRESS WAS NEEDED ON TRADE PREFERENCES AND TOWARD COMMODITY PRICE STABILIZATION. HERE, AKRAM RECOGNIZED THAT PAKISTAN'S POSITION WAS SOMEWHAT ANOMALOUS, SINCE ITS TWO BIG EXPORT COMMODITIES--COTTON AND RICE--ARE ALSO IMPORTANT US EXPORTS AND ARE NOT ANSWERABLE TO CARTEL-TYPE ACTION.

(C) TECHNOLOGY: THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT IS INTERESTED, HE SAID, IN HAVING THE UN ESTABLISH SOME KIND OF ORGANIZATION  
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WHICH WOULD HELP LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES SCREEN AND APPLY TECHNOLOGY OF BENEFIT TO THEIR ECONOMIES. IT WAS NOT

CLEAR WHAT KIND OF ORGANIZATION THE GOP IS CONSIDERING; AKRAM SEEMED TO HAVE IN MIND A CROSS BETWEEN A CLEARING HOUSE AND A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE OPERATION. WHEN ASKED IF THE GOP WAS THINKING OF USING UNIDO FOR THIS, AKRAM REPLIED NEGATIVELY.

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ACTION IO-10

INFO OCT-01 AF-06 ARA-06 EUR-12 EA-06 NEA-10 ISO-00 AGR-05

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SP-02 FEAE-00 OMB-01 OES-03 ERDA-05 OIC-02 IOE-00

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R 230532Z MAY 75 ZDK  
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AMEMBASSY ACCRA  
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS  
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE  
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES  
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AMEMBASSY CARACAS  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 4644

5. EMBOFFS WENT OVER AT SOME LENGTH THE APPROACH GIVEN IN REF A, PARA 6, ON THE GENESIS OF WORLD ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND THE WORLD ECONOMIC STRUCTURE. AKRAM AGREED THAT PROGRESS DEPENDED ON INCREASED PRODUCTION, AND NOT MERELY ON REDISTRIBUTION, BUT CLEARLY EXPECTED THAT " THE TYPICAL LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRY" WOULD BE MORE INTERESTED IN REDISTRIBUTION. SIMILARLY, IN A LONG DISCUSSION OF WHICH KINDS OF "RHETORICAL EXPRESSIONS" WERE ESPECIALLY SENSITIVE IN THE US, AKRAM PROFESSED TO UNDERSTAND US SENSITIVITY ABOUT CHARGES THAT WE WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PLIGHT OF THE LDCS, BUT ADDED THAT "WE HAD TO UNDERSTAND" THAT " THE TYPICAL LDC" SAW THINGS DIFFERENTLY. AKRAM URGED SEVERAL TIMES THAT THE US PRESENT CONCRETE ALTERNATIVES TO PROPOSALS IT FOUND UNAPLAIABLE (SUCH AS COMMODITY PRODUCERS' ASSOCIATIONS), ARGUING ESSENTIALLY THAT YOU CANNOT BEAT SOMETHING WITH NOTHING. TO EMBOFFS' POINT THAT THE UNGA SHOULD NOT TRY TO USURP THE PLACE OF OTHER AGENCIES SUCH AS GATT AND IMF, HE RESPONDED THAT LDCS CONSIDERED THOSE INSTITUTIONS TO BE DOMINATED BY DC'S AND WERE IMPATIENT WITH THE PROGRESS OF MTN AND IMF MONETARY REFPORM. OF COURSE, IT WOULD NOT DO TO USURP THE ROLE OF THE OTHER INSTITUTIONS, HE SAID, BUT THE LDCS HAD TO USE THE FORUMS IN WHICH THEY HAD A GREATER VOICE TO PRESS FOR THEIR GOALS.

6. EMBOFFS BELIEVE THAT THEIR DISCUSSION WITH AKRAM WAS USEFUL, ALTHOUGH IT PROBABLY CHANGED NO ONE'S MIND AND IN GENERAL EXPOSED MORE LIMITATIONS THAN OPPORTUNITIES IN DEALING WITH PAKISTANI POSITIONS AT 7 SS. AKRAM SAID THAT HE EXPECTED TO HAVE A MORE PRECISE READING ON PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT POSITIONS IN LATE JUNE OR EARLY JULY, AND WE PROPOSE TO CONTINUE THIS DIALOGUE.

7. OUR STRONGEST ALLY, IN FUTURE EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE PAKISTANI PRAGMATISM, IS PAKISTAN' S DESIRE FOR CONCRETE RESULTS. THE GOP IS WELL AWARE THAT THESE DEPEND ON THE HELP OF THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. WE ARE LIKELY TO HAVE FAR MORE IMPACT  
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IN SPECIFIC DISCUSSIONS ON CONCRETE ISSUES BEFORE 7 SS THAN IN FURTHER CONVERSATIONS ABOUT OUR GENERAL APPROACH. TO A LESSER DEGREE, PAKISTAN'S COMMERCIAL INTERESTS WILL ALSO ENCOURAGE PRAGMATISM.

8. ON THE OTHER SIDE, HOWEVER, PAKISTAN'S PRESENT EAGERNESS TO MAINTAIN ITS CLOSE TIES WITH OTHER MUSLIM COUNTRIES AND TO IMPROVE ITS THIRD-WORLD CREDENTIALS

PLACE SEVERE LIMITS ON THE FLEXIBILITY OF HTER POSITION.  
THE CHANCES OF PAKISTAN PUBLICLY BREAKING RANKS WITH THE  
MAINSTREAM OF THE GROUP OF 77 ARE NIL, AND IT WILL BE  
CHARY OF OPPOSING ANY LDC CONSENSUS WHICH SEEMS TO BE  
DEVELOPING. IF THERE IS TO BE ANY CHANCE OF ENLISTING  
PAKISTAN'S HELP IN STOPPING ANY LDC STEAMROLLER, WE MUST  
DO SO BEFORE IT STARTS.  
BYROADE

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## Message Attributes

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**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
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**TAGS:** EGEN, PK, UNGA  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006